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Interpretational tendencies in ambiguous situations were investigated as causal
mechanisms of altruistic compensation. We used a training procedure to induce a
tendency to interpret one’s own advantages as unjustified. In a subsequent mixed-game,
participants had to decide whether to invest their own money to compensate a victim
of a norm violation. The amount of one’s own resources invested as an altruistic
compensation was enhanced after the training procedure compared to controls. These
findings suggest that interpretational patterns with regard to injustice determine prosocial
behavior. The training procedure offers a potential intervention strategy for enhancing
altruistic compensation in bystander situations in which people must invest their own
resources to restore justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Human behavior is guided by norms such as reciprocity and
concerns for justice and fairness. People employ these standards
to judge how right or wrong an action is (Kassin et al., 2010).
Observed norm violations can trigger emotional reactions and
motivate behavior to stop or redress the transgression. A particu-
larly intriguing phenomenon appears in anonymous interactions
in which an actor can expect no reward for a costly interven-
tion. Investing one’s own resources and taking risks to punish
rule violations without direct self-interest is known as altruistic
intervention. From an evolutionary standpoint, altruistic inter-
ventions serve important societal functions. Despite costs to the
individual, the protection of norms maximizes the joint outcome
of the group, thus raising its total fitness. To maintain this benefit,
norm violation is socially sanctioned. Norm-protecting behavior
can be seen as altruistic and in special cases prosocial because
it guarantees the maintenance of a positive outcome for society,
even at great cost and without direct benefit for the actor (e.g.,
Bowles and Gintis, 2004).
Previous research has revealed two types of altruistic
interventions—altruistic punishment (e.g., Fetchenhauer and
Huang, 2004) and altruistic compensation (e.g., Leliveld et al.,
2012). In altruistic punishment, an uninvolved third party invests
his/her own resources to stop or redress the perceived norm
violation of a perpetrator. In altruistic compensation, a costly
intervention is directed at abating the needs of victims of the
norm violation (Lotz et al., 2011). Both are investigated by using
the mixed-game (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2002). This experimen-
tal game involves three Persons A, B, and C. Person A gets 10 C
with the opportunity to share any amount of this endowment
with a powerless Person B. Person C has the costly option to
invest any amount of his/her initial 10 C to compensate Person
B by increasing his/her outcome and/or to punish Person A by
reducing his/her outcome.
Results have shown that observers are willing to punish Person
A (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009)
or to compensate the victim (Lotz et al., 2011; Leliveld et al.,
2012) at their own expense when Person A makes an unequal
offer to Person B (e.g., 10:0 C). However, people differ systemati-
cally in their proneness to altruistic interventions. Addressing the
psychological processes driving altruistic punishment, research
has suggested deterrence and just deserts as underlying motives
(Carlsmith, 2006), whereas altruistic compensation requires a
concern for the victim’s outcome (Darley and Pittman, 2003). To
date, the underlying mechanisms such as the interpretation of the
situation and emotional reactions have not been investigated in
detail.
It seems plausible that in ambiguous social situations, the
interpretation as unjust or just leads to distinct and even opposite
reactions. Accordingly, we aimed to uncover how interpretational
processes in ambiguous situations contribute to the understand-
ing of why some people invest their own resources to compensate
a victim of another person’s norm violation. Results will help to
explain when and why altruistic compensation is displayed and
potentially offer opportunities to enhance this behavior.
Evidence for the importance of interpretational processes for
interpersonal behavior has been provided in research on negative
social interactions. For aggression, theoretical models emphasize
social information processing as a crucial factor. Thus, Crick and
Dodge (1994) propose the “hostile attribution bias” as a psy-
chological process that leads to aggressive behavior. It includes
the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as containing
hostile intent toward oneself (Dodge and Crick, 1990; Tremblay
and Belchevski, 2004). Research has shown that biased hostile
interpretations in ambiguous situations increase the probabil-
ity of aggressive behavior (e.g., Bushman and Anderson, 2002).
Furthermore, in their meta-analysis, Orobio de Castro et al.
(2002) reported a strong correlation between dispositional hostile
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attributions and behavioral aggression, indicating that people are
generally more aggressive if they tend to interpret ambiguity as
hostility.
Interpretational processes are stressed in a similar way by
theoretical models of prosocial interpersonal behavior, includ-
ing altruistic interventions. The seminal model by Latané and
Darley (1970) proposes five stages of helping behavior as deter-
mined by psychological processes. Accordingly, an incident has
to be witnessed and interpreted as an emergency. If an ambigu-
ous situation is not interpreted as an emergency, it will not
trigger helping behavior. Thus, interpretation is assumed to
play a key role in determining subsequent behavioral reactions.
However, there is only indirect evidence that interpretational
processes are indeed crucial for prosocial behavior. First, in
social psychology, research on the bystander effect has shown
that an increasing number of inactive bystanders can reduce
the probability that any single person will help. Assumedly, the
reactions of others are used to interpret the ambiguous situ-
ation regarding the necessity of intervention (e.g., Latané and
Darley, 1970; Fischer et al., 2006). Thus, perceiving the inaction
of others can lead to an interpretation of the situation as less
critical.
Second, there is indirect evidence for the relevance of inter-
pretational processes for altruistic interventions in personality
psychology. Specifically, stable and consistent individual differ-
ences in the perceptional readiness and emotional reactivity to
injustice— namely, justice sensitivity (Schmitt, 1996; Schmitt
et al., 2010)—have been identified as predictors of prosocial
behavior (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Baumert et al., 2013).
Furthermore, justice sensitivity predicted altruistic punishment
and altruistic compensation in the mixed-game (Lotz et al.,
2011) described above. Importantly, it has been proposed that
differences in justice sensitivity involve chronic interpretational
tendencies that cause behavior. Preliminary empirical evidence
showed that people high (compared to low) in justice sensitiv-
ity perceived an ambiguous situation as less just (Baumert and
Schmitt, 2009) and were more ready to resolve ambiguous sen-
tence fragments that yielded an unjust connotation (Baumert
et al., 2012). In the mixed-game, when witnessing an unequal
allocation by Person A, persons high in justice sensitivity may
tend to interpret their own favorable outcome in the role of
Person C as unjustified compared to Person B. Thus, their altru-
istic compensation may be directed at reducing the subjectively
unjustified discrepancy between Person B and their own more
favorable condition. The causal relevance of this interpretational
pattern for triggering altruistic compensation has yet to be tested.
In sum, interpretational processes seem to play a crucial role
in determining prosocial behavior, including altruistic interven-
tions. As there is only indirect evidence, we aimed to fill this gap
by experimentally testing interpretational processes as determi-
nants of altruistic intervention.
IMPORTANCE OF INTERPRETATIONAL PROCESSES
When a bystander witnesses a perpetrator victimizing another
person, social-comparison processes (Festinger, 1954) may be
relevant for subsequent behavioral reactions. Observers can com-
pare themselves with the perpetrator or the victim. Research
suggests that altruistic punishment occurs if the observer com-
pares his/her own standing with the perpetrator. Perceiving that
the perpetrator has increased his/her status by breaking social
norms can lead the observer to punish the perpetrator (Darley
and Pittman, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). By contrast, lit-
tle research has focused on the possibility that the observer of a
norm violation interprets him- or herself as relatively privileged
in comparison with a victim. In other words, the bystander may
also engage in downward comparison. As we argue in the present
paper, a focus on the victim might be a crucial determinant of
altruistic compensation.
In general, downward comparison implies that one’s focus is
on a victim who is worse off. So far, downward comparisons have
primarily been investigated from the perspective of a cognitive
coping mechanism (e.g., Carmona et al., 2006) that helps to reg-
ulate negative emotions (see Buunk and Gibbons, 2007, for an
overview) and maintain a positive self-perception (Taylor et al.,
1990), especially in stressful situations (Buunk and Ybema, 1995).
Regarding prosocial behavior, Yip and Kelly (2013) reported that
downward comparison with targets whose performance was infe-
rior to one’s own led to reduced subsequent prosocial reactions
and self-reported empathy toward others compared with controls
who did not engage in social comparison. However, no research
has systematically investigated whether the discrepancy between
one’s own and the other person’s situation is interpreted as justi-
fied or not. Importantly, we assume that downward comparison
can lead to an increase or a decline in prosocial behavior, depend-
ing on whether one’s own relative advantage is perceived as
legitimate. In this case, positive emotions that are not expected to
lead to altruistic interventions should arise. By contrast, the inter-
pretation of one’s own advantage as illegitimate should result in
the motivation to restore justice (Lockwood, 2002). Accordingly,
when faced with an unequal allocation in the mixed-game, one
could assume that altruistic compensation is motivated in the
role of Person C, interpreting one’s own outcome of 10 C as
unjustified in comparison with Person B’s outcome.
In sum, we argue that behavioral reactions in situations in
which another person is victimized by a third person depend on
the interpretation of one’s own better conditions as unjustified
or not. Until now, the causal role of the proposed interpre-
tational pattern has not been formally tested. In the present
study, we systematically manipulated interpretational tendencies
in ambiguous social situations and tested their effect on altruistic
compensation.
TRAINING OF INTERPRETATIONAL TENDENCIES
In our study, we investigated whether the interpretation of
ambiguous situations in terms of one’s own unjustified advan-
tages would cause altruistic compensation. In order to test the
effect of interpretations on behavior, it is necessary to experimen-
tally induce a specific interpretational readiness. Thus, as a first
research question, we wanted to know whether it would be pos-
sible to induce short-term changes in interpretational tendencies.
As a second step, we then tested the behavioral effects of these
tendencies.
In research on anxiety, methods tomanipulate interpretational
biases with regard to threat have been successfully implemented
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(MacLeod and Cohen, 1993; Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000).
Mathews andMackintosh (2000) presented participants with sen-
tences that remained ambiguous with regard to their valence
until the last few words. The last few words resolved the ambigu-
ity, indicating either a positive or a negative event. Importantly,
the disambiguating words were presented as word fragments.
Participants had to read the sentences and complete the fragments
as quickly as possible. In order to induce a negative (vs. posi-
tive) interpretational tendency, participants repeatedly received
ambiguous sentences that were always resolved as negative (or
positive, respectively). Assumedly, participants will then adopt a
readiness to interpret ambiguous sentences as negative (vs. pos-
itive), enabling them to complete the fragmented words more
quickly. In order to assess the effectiveness of this training pro-
cedure, Mathews and Mackintosh employed a further set of
ambiguous sentences: One half were resolved to be negative; the
other half were resolved to be positive. Response latencies for
fragment completion were measured. Results revealed that partic-
ipants who were trained to interpret the ambiguous situations in
a negative way were faster at completing the subsequent negative
word fragments compared with participants trained to interpret
the ambiguity in a positive way, and vice versa for positive word
fragments.
In the present research, we modified this procedure by using
sentences that were ambiguous with regard to justice or injustice.
The sentences described situations in which the narrator receives
a relative advantage, but whether this advantage is justified or
not remains ambiguous. In the unjust training condition, the last
words of the sentences resolved this ambiguity in the sense that
the advantage was presented as unjustified and the narrator was
seen as the beneficiary of an injustice. In the control condition,
all sentences remained neutral with regard to in/justice. For all
sentences, the final disambiguating words were presented as frag-
ments. We instructed our participants to adopt the perspective of
the narrator and to respond to the word fragments as quickly as
possible.
In sum, we expected that repeatedly resolving ambiguous sen-
tences to reflect unjust situations would induce a readiness to
interpret one’s own relative advantage as unjustified in ambigu-
ous situations. This readiness was expected to appear in reaction
times for the completion of word fragments in additional sets of
ambiguous sentences. We expected that reaction times for com-
pleting disambiguating fragments that indicated an unjust benefit
would be reduced in the unjust training condition compared with
the control condition (Hypothesis 1).
If the training procedure was able to induce such an inter-
pretational readiness, we further predicted effects on altruistic
compensation in a subsequent mixed-game. When people were
induced to interpret ambiguous situations in such a way that
they readily saw their own positive outcome as unjustified, they
were expected to be more prone to behave prosocially in a sub-
sequent mixed-game in which they witnessed an unequal split
of money between Person A and Person B. Accordingly, persons
in the unjust training condition were expected to invest more of
their own money to compensate Person B (Hypothesis 2a). In
addition, we explored whether the training also affects altruistic
punishment. Possibly, this is not the case because the tendency to
interpret one’s outcome as unjustified or notmay not be a relevant
process driving this kind of behavior. For altruistic punishment,
a focus on the perpetrator might play an important role and not
a focus on the victim that is worse off which is implied by the
training procedure.
Furthermore, to rule out an alternative explanation for behav-
ioral effects of the training, emotions were assessed. We expected
the training not to affect emotions directly but to affect the
interpretation of the situation.
METHOD
SAMPLE
Undergraduate psychology students that had not joined a
similar experiment were invited to participate in a study
ostensibly on text comprehension. Seventy-eight persons (85%
female) followed the invitation. Ages ranged from 18 to 46
years (M = 21.97, SD = 4.83). A posteriori power analyses
revealed 1-β = 0.71 to detect medium size effect d = 0.5 in
a two-tailed t-test. All participants spoke German fluently. In
return for their participation, students received extra course
credit.
PROCEDURE
When participants arrived at the laboratory session, they were
seated at one of three separated workplaces and randomly
assigned to one of two experimental conditions: the unjust train-
ing (n = 38) or the control condition (n = 39). Then participants
worked on a word fragment completion task that contained
training trials as explained below. Following the training trials,
participants further completed unjust, just, and neutral probe
fragments. These probes were designed to record how readily par-
ticipants resolved an ambiguous sentence in a way that indicated
an unjust or just outcome. The neutral probe fragments were
designed to measure baseline reaction times to word fragments.
Subsequently, participants played a mixed-game with three play-
ers as described earlier (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Ostensibly at
random, they were assigned to the role of Person C and witnessed
an unequal split of money made by one of the players (10:0 C,
see below). As a manipulation check, emotions were assessed.
Participants then decided whether to invest their own money to
compensate the person who had received nothing and/or to pun-
ish the person who had made the unequal split. Next, they were
asked about their general beliefs regarding the mixed-game and
the goal of the study. Finally, they were debriefed, thanked, and
dismissed.
MATERIALS
All materials were presented in German. Here, we provide our
own English translations.
Fragment Completion Task
Participants had to read the description of a student’s day, imag-
ining themselves in the narrator’s situation. The description con-
tained different passages that were presented sentence by sentence
on the computer screen. The final words of some sentences were
fragmented, and participants had to complete the missing letters
(see below for examples). The instructions said to press a marked
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button to continue as quickly as possible once they had finished
reading the sentence or knew the correct solution of a fragment.
On the following screen, there was space to type in the missing
letters. After completion, feedback was provided and either the
word “correct” appeared in green letters or the word “wrong” in
red letters. Participants first worked on three practice trials that
were followed by 24 training trials intermixed with seven neutral
filler items in order to mask the goal of the study.
Training Fragments. Twenty-four passages were designed for the
training and differed systematically between the experimental
conditions.
In the unjust training condition, the first part of the passage was
a description of a situation in which the individual is relatively
advantaged, but it is ambiguous whether the advantage is justi-
fied or not. The fragmented final part of the passage indicated
the relative advantage as not justified, presenting the narrator as
the beneficiary of an injustice. In the control condition, passages
described the same situations in a neutral way.
Examples are:
Unjust training condition: “I need to obtain an internship
this semester. My father knows a famous marketing boss. Despite
strong competition, I am given an internship in his company
because the marketing boss tru_ts _y fa_her.” (correct response:
“trusts my father”)
Control condition: “I need to obtain an internship this
semester. My father suggests that I try the field of marketing. After
extensive research, I find a company with an interesting position,
and I read the j_b _rofile ca_efully.” (correct response: “job profile
carefully”)
All materials were pretested. Each passage was rated by 30
raters (ages from 19 to 57, M = 24.57, SD = 8.22) on a scale
with the anchors −3 (very unjust), 0 (neither nor), and 3 (just).
Passages from the unjust training condition were given the lowest
ratings (M = −1.60, SD = 0.61). The equivalent neutral passages
were rated as rather neutral (M = 0.79, SD = 0.81). Ratings of
the two sets of passages differed significantly from each other,
t(28) = −15.76, p < 0.01, d = −3.39.
Assessment of Interpretational Readiness
The training passages were followed by 12 probe fragments to
assess interpretational readiness. All participants completed four
just, four unjust, and four neutral probe fragments that were
presented in a random order fixed across participants.
The structure of the probe passages was similar to the train-
ing trials. The narrator was presented as relatively advantaged,
but whether the advantage was justified remained ambiguous. For
the just probes, the fragmented words resolved the ambiguity in
a way that presented the participant’s own outcome as justified.
For the unjust probes, the fragmented words resolved the ambi-
guity to indicate that the advantage was unjustified. The neutral
probes had no justice-relevant content. Please note that the pas-
sages were not matched in length across probe types. Therefore, a
comparison of reaction times across probe-types within groups is
not informative because it is contaminated by different length of
the probe sentences.
Examples are:
Just probe: “This evening at my gym, I would like to do a new
workout that costs additional money. But in contrast to the other
members, I do not have to pay becau_e I ha_e a vo_cher.” (correct
response: “because I have a voucher”).
Unjust probe: “In the Department of Psychology, there is an
open position for a research assistant, which is much sought-
after. Although another fellow student applies, I get the position
because I have connecti_ns to t_e depart_ent.” (correct response:
“connections to the department”).
Neutral probe: “After the gym, I meet some colleagues at a
cocktail bar.We talk about the first weeks of the semester and have
lots of fun. Because we have not seen each other for a long time,
we plan to spend so_e t_me tog_ther.” (correct response: “some
time together”).
We recorded how quickly participants pressed the button after
reading the fragmented sentence. In order to obtain a comparable
reaction time measure for each participant, they were instructed
to react as quickly as possible. After deciding what the correct
solution was, they had to type the letters in on the next screen.
Probe passages were pretested together with the training pas-
sages (see above for sample characteristics). We selected four
passages rated most unjust (M = −1.36, SD = 1.36) and four
passages rated as neutral (M = 0.93, SD = 1.09), t(26) = −8.13,
p < 0.01, d = −0.36. Because the just probes did not differ signif-
icantly from the neutral probes, we modified those with ratings
close to zero in order to make the just content more salient
and pretested them again in a sample of 6 raters (ages from 24
to 28, M = 25.7, SD = 1.63). Even after modification, the four
just probes differed only descriptively (M = 1.17, SD = 1.16)
from the neutral probes, t(32) = −0.36, p = 0.72, d = −0.17.
Regarding the interrater agreement, there was a significant intra-
class correlation between the ratings for just sentences, r = 0.21,
p = 0.05. The raters did not significantly agree in their ratings
for unjust, r = 0.07, p = 0.18, and neutral sentences, r = −0.03,
p = 0.83.
Mixed-game
On the computer screen, participants were informed that they
would be interacting with two other anonymous participants and
that they would be randomly assigned to one of three roles, but all
participants were actually given the role of Person C. They learned
that initially, Person A would receive 10 C and would have the
opportunity to share any amount of this money with an anony-
mous and powerless Person B. Person C was initially endowed
with 10 C that could be invested to change the distribution made
by Person A.
Participants were then told that they had the role of Person
C. They were informed that Person A had allegedly decided to
keep the entire 10 C for him/herself. Participants were informed
that they could keep their own 10 C or use it to change the out-
comes of Person A and/or Person B. Every investment of 1 C
would lead to a 2 C change in the other persons’ outcomes, mean-
ing 2 C less for Person A or 2 C more for Person B. Participants
were asked to decide about their possible investment regarding
the punishment of Person A and the compensation of Person B.
We assessed how much money participants invested in these two
decisions.
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Manipulation Checks. Right before participants decided on
whether to invest their money to punish and/or to compensate,
their emotional reactions to the unequal allocation were assessed.
Participants were asked to indicate on a response scale from 1
(totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree) how well each of 14 state-
ments described their present feelings. Among filler items, we
assessed outrage and guilt with four items each (outrage: e.g.
“I am outraged about the distribution”; α = 0.91; guilt: “I feel
guilty”; α = 0.73).
RESULTS
EFFECTS OF TRAINING ON INTERPRETATIONAL READINESS
Before aggregating the reaction times for unjust, just, and neutral
probes, we omitted the error trials in which participants did not
complete the fragment correctly. Error rates were low for the dif-
ferent types of probes (4.49% for unjust probes, 5.77% for just
probes, and 5.77% for neutral probes). In addition, we corrected
for outliers by omitting individual reaction times that were faster
than 500ms or slower than 15,000ms (11.86% for unjust probes,
11.86% for just probes, and 6.41% for neutral probes).
To test the effectiveness of our training procedure in inducing
an interpretational readiness, we calculated a 2 (training pro-
cedure: training/control) × 3 (probe type: unjust/just/neutral)
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. We found
a significant main effect of probe type, F(2, 73) = 7.17, p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.16, as well as a significant Probe × Training interac-
tion effect, F(2, 73) = 5.02, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.12 (see Table 1).
Decomposing this interaction effect, there was a tendency that
participants in the training condition reacted faster to unjust
probes (M = 5716.47, SD = 1212.77) than participants in the
control group (M = 6130.74, SD = 1196.27). However, this con-
trast was not significant, t(75) = −1.51, p = 0.14, d = −0.35. In
addition, there was a tendency that participants in the train-
ing condition reacted slower to neutral probes (M = 5640.35,
SD = 1355.55) than participants in the control condition (M =
5168.86, SD = 1049.43), t(75) = 1.69, p = 0.09, d = 0.39. For
reaction times to just probes, there was no difference between the
training condition (M = 5596.82, SD = 1107.32) and the con-
trol condition (M = 5683.54, SD = 1157.97), t(75) = −0.34, p =
0.78, d = −0.01. Since the passages were not matched in length
across probes types, we refrained from a comparison between
probe types within one condition.
In order to investigate the specific effect of the training pro-
cedure regarding unjust interpretations over and above general
Table 1 | means and (standard deviations) of reactions times for
unjust, just, and neutral probes, separately for the unjust training
group and control group.
Reaction times Unjust training groupM (SD) Control groupM (SD)
Unjust probes 5716 (1213) 6131 (1196)
Just probes 5598 (1107) 5684 (1158)
Neutral probes 5640 (1356) 5169 (1049)
Unjust probes = mean reaction times for unjust probe fragments (ms);
just probes = mean reaction times for just probe fragments (ms); neutral
probes = mean reaction times for neutral probe fragments (ms).
effects on reaction times, we corrected for reaction times to neu-
tral probes as a baseline when analyzing reaction times for unjust
probes. We calculated difference terms by subtracting reaction
times for neutral probes from reaction times for unjust probes
and just probes, respectively. This way, it is possible to test for a
specific effect of the unjust training condition on the readiness
to resolve an ambiguity to imply an injustice over and above the
general readiness to complete fragments.
We conducted a univariate ANOVAs with the factor training
(training/control) and difference scores as dependent variables. In
accordance with Hypothesis 1, we found significant main effects
of the training on the difference score for unjust minus neu-
tral probes, F(1, 75) = 10.09, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.12, and on the
difference score for just minus neutral probes, F(1, 75) = 3.59,
p = 0.051, η2 = 0.051. When corrected for reaction times for
neutral probes as a baseline, participants in the training condition
reacted significantly faster to unjust probes (M = 76.12, SD =
178.16) and to just probes (M = −43.53, SD = 176.75) than par-
ticipants in the control condition (unjust probes: M = 876.44,
SD = 178.16; just probes:M = 453.37, SD = 176.75).
EFFECTS OF TRAINING ON EMOTIONS
We tested for potential effects of the training procedure on emo-
tional reactions toward the unequal allocation of money. Separate
t-tests using condition as independent variable and outrage and
guilt as dependent variables, did not yield any significant results
for guilt, t(75) = 0.61, p = 0.55, d = 0.13, or for outrage, t(75) =
−0.35, p = 0.73, d = −0.08.
ALTRUISTIC COMPENSATION AND PUNISHMENT
We computed separate t-tests to investigate whether our training
procedure affected behaviors in the mixed-game. For altruis-
tic compensation, there was, consistent with Hypothesis 2a, a
significant training effect, t(75) = −2.34, p = 0.02, d = −0.55.
Participants in the training condition invested on average approx-
imately 1 C more (M = 5.29, SD = 1.99) to compensate Person
B than participants in the control condition (M = 4.33, SD =
1.56). In accordance with Hypothesis 2b, there was no signifi-
cant effect of the training on altruistic punishment, t(75) = 0.47,
p = 0.64, d = −0.11. Participants in the unjust training condi-
tion invested a similar amount of money to reduce the outcome
of Person A (M = 5.89, SD = 1.74) compared to those in the
control condition (M = 6.10, SD = 2.10).
DISCUSSION
The goal of our study was to investigate the psychological pro-
cesses that underlie altruistic compensation by identifying a spe-
cific interpretational pattern and testing its role in causing this
behavioral reaction. We found evidence that interpretational pro-
cesses in ambiguous social situations are relevant for explaining
why some people invest their own resources to compensate a
victim of another person’s norm violations.
We successfully adapted a training procedure from anxiety
research that was effective at experimentally inducing a tendency
to interpret one’s own better outcome as unjustified (Hypothesis
1). Moreover, our results showed that the training procedure sys-
tematically increased altruistic compensation (Hypothesis 2a).
Compared with the control condition, participants trained to
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interpret their own better outcome as unjustified investedmore of
their own resources to compensate another person who was dis-
advantaged by a third person. Importantly, the behavioral effect
of the training cannot be attributed to emotional effects of the
procedure. Our study complements prior research on downward
social comparison in important ways. Whereas downward com-
parison can decrease prosocial behaviors (Yip and Kelly, 2013),
our findings suggest that this process can also serve to enhance
altruistic compensation, depending on whether one interprets
one’s own better outcome as unjustified. As expected (Hypothesis
2b), there was no effect of the training on altruistic punishment.
For punishment to occur, a focus on the perpetrator is necessary
(Darley and Pittman, 2003). By contrast, altruistic compensation
depends on the interpretation of one’s standing relative to the
victim.
For future research, the investigation of chronic interpreta-
tional patterns underlying personality dispositions could shed
further light on the relevance of these processes for prosocial
behavior. As explained above, justice sensitivity (Schmitt et al.,
2010) has been found to be correlated with interpretational biases
(Baumert and Schmitt, 2009; Baumert et al., 2012) and to predict
altruistic compensation (Lotz et al., 2011) as well as other forms
of prosocial behavior (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Baumert et al.,
2013). Accordingly, it seems possible that this disposition mod-
ulates the individual effectiveness of the training procedure for
changing interpretational patterns and enhancing altruistic com-
pensation. Specifically, justice sensitivity has been differentiated
according to the perspectives from which injustice can be experi-
enced: as a victim, as an observer, as beneficiary or as perpetrator
(Mikula, 1994). One could assume that high victim sensitives
are less susceptible for training effects than low victim sensitives,
because they tend to interpret own advantages as compensation
for past injustice. By contrast, high beneficiary sensitives could
respond stronger to the training procedure than low beneficiary
sensitives because these people tend to see an own better outcome
as unjustified, a pattern that corresponds to the content of the
training sentences.
LIMITATIONS
To improve future studies, we will note several limitations of the
present research.
First, the measurement of the interpretational tendency could
be improved. Unjust, just, and neutral probes were not perfectly
matched in length. Therefore, the comparison of reaction times
across the three probe types was difficult to interpret. It is possible
that the main effect of probe type, with unjust probes eliciting
longer reaction times than just and neutral probes, resulted from
the unequal length of the passages rather than from the specific
content. Matching the probes more closely by length will allow
for more specific conclusions.
More importantly, just probes were sometimes rated as neu-
tral on the pretest despite further modification of these passages.
Thus, the just content should be made more salient to obtain
greater differences in the ratings between just and neutral probes.
However, it seems possible that just situations are generally expe-
rienced as normal and therefore not perceived as distinct from
neutral passages. By contrast, our pretests suggest that the unjust
passages are perceived as clearly unjust and distinct from neutral
situations, despite the non-significant interrater agreement.
Second, further strategies for the induction of interpretational
tendencies could be investigated. In our study, we employed a
training procedure based on the assumption that the active com-
pletion of fragments, which leads to an unjust connotation of the
ambiguous passage, induces a readiness to interpret one’s own
advantages as unjustified. However, the possibility that a pas-
sive priming without fragment completion might have a similar
effect cannot be excluded. In other words, merely reading the
training passages might also induce an interpretational tendency.
In/justice-related concepts might be activated during reading,
guiding the interpretation of ambiguous situations (e.g., Erdley
and D’Agostino, 1988) in such a way that one’s own advantage
is seen as unjustified. Introducing a priming condition without
fragment completion in future studies will allow for the investi-
gation of this option. Importantly, if this condition has the same
effects on reaction times and behavior in the mixed-game as
our training procedure, this finding would further confirm the
causality of the proposed interpretational tendency for altruistic
compensation. Furthermore, the inclusion of a just training con-
dition, where ambiguous sentences have to be resolved to imply
justice could allow more specific conclusions regarding behav-
ioral reactions. Possibly, the induced tendency to interpret own
advantages as justified could attenuate prosocial behavior.
Third, future research could investigate the permanence of our
training’s effect on altruistic compensation. For practical pur-
poses, knowledge about the stability of interventions that enhance
this kind of prosocial behavior is necessary. In a longitudinal
study, the training and priming procedures described above could
be compared on the stability of their effects. The effect of our
training procedure that included an active completion of the frag-
ments on altruistic compensationmight last longer than the effect
elicited via a passive priming procedure.
Fourth, it would be interesting for further studies to investi-
gate gender differences in response to the training procedure. In
our sample, such a comparison is not possible due to the unequal
proportion of males and females. Future studies should overcome
this limitation.
CONCLUSION
Despite its limitations, the present research is an important
step toward understanding the psychological processes that cause
altruistic compensation. We were able to experimentally manipu-
late interpretational patterns with regard to injustice in ambigu-
ous social situations. The tendency to interpret one’s own advan-
tages as unjustified was induced by a training procedure and in
turn enhanced the amount of one’s own resources that a person
invested to compensate a victim of a norm violation. By improv-
ing and further testing this training procedure, appropriate inter-
ventions can be designed to enhance prosocial behavior—in
particular, altruistic compensation in bystander situations that
require an intervention in which people must invest their own
resources in order to restore justice.
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